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Abstract: Two examples illustrate that if your competitors in an
auction vary their behavior with the amount of information that you
have, then vour obtaining additional information may reduce your
expected profit. Therefore, unlike in traditional decision theoretic
settings, the value of information in a competitive setting may be
strictly negative.

Introduction:
Imagine finding a bottle imprisoning a genie. The genie promises
to provide you with information about the true characteristics of
objects that you plan to bid on at upcoming auctions. Not only will
the genie provide the information free of charge, but he promises that,
taken together with information you would have had anyway, his infor-
mation will strictly decrease your uncertainty in the objects ' true
values. Should you free the genie?
One line of reasoning goes as follows: "You can always choose to
ignore the genie's information. This would leave you in the same
informational state as if you hadn't freed the genie. Therefore, by
freeing the genie, you can always do at least as well—and with some
luck, at least occasionally strictly better—than by not freeing the
genie." In general, decision theorists might use such a argument to
conclude that the genie's information—or information in general—must
always have a non-negative value.
On the other hand, what if your competitors would know whether or
not you freed the genie? If there is any positive probability that
your competitors' knowing that you have access to the additional infor-
mation the genie provides would make them change their bidding strategies,
then your ignoring the genie's information will leave you in the same
informational state as without the information, but will not necessarily
leave you in the same strategical state. Therefore, the previous line
of reasoning no longer assures that the additional information always
has a non-negative value if your competitors' behavior might change as
a result of your having this information.
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Our shooting a hole in the traditional argument when applied to a
non-traditional competitive situation does not in itself guarantee that
some other argument could not assure us that freeing the genie never
hurts. Unfortunately, the hole we shot turns out to be fatal. This
paper presents a couple of examples to illustrate that in certain cases
of competitive bidding, a single bidder's acquiring additional informa-
tion will strictly reduce his expected profit in an auction if his com-
petitors knows he has this additional information.
Background
We are not the first to investigate the value of information in
auctions, or other competitive situations. For example, Milgrom and
Weber (1982) illustrate that providing all bidders with the same addi-
tional information may well increase the bid-taker's expected revenue,
and therefore, decrease each bidder's expected profit, in symmetric
models of auctions. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber (1983) also provide
an asymmetric example in which the less informed bidder has a greater
expected profit than a better informed bidder who is known to have this
better information. However, this and other previous work's focus dif-
fers from our focus on the effect on a single bidder of that bidding
acquiring, and being known to acquire, additional information not shared
by other bidders.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber (1983) show quite generally
that if one bidder has all the information available to a second bidder,
then the less informed bidder must have zero expected profit at the Nash
equilibrium of the corresponding auction game. On the other hand, if
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all bidders have exactly the same information—however perfect or im-
perfect it mav be—then almost any model of competition predicts that
all bidders will have zero expected profit. This suggests looking at
examples intermediate to these two extremes, cases in which the less
informed bidder has some private information, but is still strictly
less informed than a second bidder. If the less informed bidder has
a strictly positive expected profit in such intermediate cases, then
improving his information to the point that he has the same information
as the (formerly) better informed bidders decreases his expected profit,
Therefore, the value of such additional information would be strictly
negative. The following sections present two such examples.
First Example:
Consider a common sealed bid auction in which two risk neutral bid-
ders bid for a single object. The object has the same value to both
bidders; this common value is either zero or one. The less informed
bidder knows the a priori probability p that the object has a value of
one, and with a known probability q (and independently of the actual
value) discovers the actual value before bidding. The second bidder
always knows the true value before bidding. Roth bidders know this
entire description of the auction rules and what each bidder knows.
This example has the following Nash equilibrium: The better
informed bidder, if he knows the object to have a value of one, bids
on the interval (0, (p( 1-q )+q ( 1-p) )/( 1-pq ) ] according to the proba-
bility distribution function
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(x(l-p))/(p(l-x)) for 0<x<p(l-q)/(l-pq)
F(x) = Pr(bicKx) = {
[(l-p)(l-q)]/[(l-pq)(l-x)] for p(l-q)/(l-pq)<x<
[p(l-q)+q(l-p)]/(l-pq)
yielding an expected profit of (l-q)(l-p)/(l-pq ) ; this case occurs with
probability p. If the better informed bidder knows the object to have
value zero, then he bids zero and has an expected profit of zero. On
the other hand, if the less informed bidder doesn't know the actual
value of the object, then he bids on the interval [0,p(l-q)/( 1-pq )
]
according to the probability distribution function
H(x) = Pr(bid<x) = (l-p)/[(l-pq)(l-x)]
and has an expected profit of zero; in this case, the less informed
bidder bids zero with probability (l-p)/(l-pq ) . If the less informed
bidder knows the object to have a value of one, then he bids on the
interval [p( 1-q )/(l-pq) , (p(l-q)+q(l-p) )/(l-pq ) ] according to the
probability distribution
G(x) = Pr(bid<x) = f((l-p)/(l-pq))-(l-x)](l-q)/(q(l-x))
and has an expected profit of (l-q)( l-p)/(l-pq ) ; this case occurs with
probability pq . FinalLy, if the less informed bidder knows the object
to have value zero, then he bids zero and has an expected profit of zero,
(That this indeed specifies a Nash equilibrium may be easily verified
by checking that any bids within the specified intervals always yield
exactly the specified expected profit, and any bids outside the spe-
cified intervals yield no larger—typically strictly smaller—expected
profits. )
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Before the less informed bidder iearns whether or not he knows the
object's value, he has an expected profit of pq ( i-p)( 1-q )/(i-pq ) . Note
that when q goes to zero or unity, then this expected profit goes to
zero, as it should when the auction goes to one of the previously dis-
cussed extreme cases. However, for q strictly between zero and one, the
less informed bidder has a strictly positive expected profit. Therefore,
improving the less informed bidder's information (in the sense of Let-
ting him know the actual value with higher probability) may reduce his
expected profit. Indeed, for q greater or equal to (l-/l~-p)/p, increas-
ing q reduces the less informed bidder's expected profit. (Any increase
in any q also reduces the better informed bidder's expected profit.)
In this example, increasing the less informed bidder's probability
of observing perfect information past a certain point decreases his
own—as well as the better informed bidder's—expected profit. Although
this formally illustrates that acquiring additional information has
strictly negative value in certain situations, the example depends on
bidders behaving according to the specified bidding strategies. While
the concept of Nash equilibrium may be the best prediction of bidding
behavior that the theory has to offer, the prediction may be more or
less compelling depending on the instance. In particular, the specified
equilibrium in the above example has the less informed bidder following
a mixed strategy when he is uncertain of the object's value and has an
expected profit of zero. In the real world, why wouldn't the less
informed bidder always bid zero in cases where he has zero expected
profit?
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Second Example:
This section presents a family of auctions for which it appears
very likely that both bidders will have a strictly positive expected
profit so long as one bidder is strictly less informed than the other.
(Of course, if the less informed bidder's information improves to the
point that he has exactly the same information as his competitor, then
both bidders should have zero expected profit.) In particular, we
argue that at any Nash equilibrium, the better informed bidder has a
strictly positive expected profit. Whenever the better informed bidder
employs a strategy that yields him a strictly positive expected profit—
whether or not such a strategy is part of a Nash equilibrium—the less
informed bidder also has options yielding a strictly positive expected
profit. While we do not exhibit any equilibria to this example, or
even prove that any exist, this second example may provide a more com-
pelling argument than the first that a less informed bidder may reason-
ably expect a strictly positive expected profit in certain cases. In
such cases, improving the less informed bidder's information to be the
same as the better informed bidder's would reduce both bidders' expected
profits to zero, thereby implying a negative value to less informed bid-
der of the additional information.
Specifically, consider another sealed auction in which two risk
neutral bidders bid for a single object. This time, the object has a
value distributed over the entire unit interval; both bidders know this
distribution, whatever it might be. Furthermore, the less informed
bidder always obtains an estimate of the object's value. Probabilisti-
cally, the ratio of the actual value to the estimate is a random variable
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whose distribution has as its support the interval [1-A, L]; both bid-
ders know this distribution, whatever it might be. Note that this
estimate provides the less informed bidder with a lower bound on the
object's value. As before, the better informed bidder knows the
object's actual value. Again, both bidders know this entire descrip-
tion of the auction rules and of what each bidder knows.
The following observations argue that both bidders should expect a
strictlv positive expected profit so long as the less informed bidder
has any uncertainty about the object's actual value (in other words, so
long as A > 0). First we claim that the better informed bidder should
never bid more than the value he knows the object to have. Next, for
A > 0, the less informed bidder does not have sufficiently precise in-
formation to always bid exactly equal to the actual value. If he were
to bid so that with probability one his bid was at least as great as
the actual value, then with positive probability he would bid strictly
greater than the actual value, have outbid the better informed bidder,
and "win" the object at a loss. With no chance of submitting a bid
less than the actual value, the less informed bidder never wins the
object at a price less than the actual value. Therefore, bidding at
least the actual value with probability one results in a strictly nega-
tive expected profit for the less informed bidder; since he could do
better by not bidding at all, we conclude that for at least some non-
zero probability set of actual values, the less informed bid turns out
to be less than the actual value with positive probability.
Now, with the less informed bidder's bid being strictLy less than
the actual value with positive probability, the better informed bidder
can obtain a strictly positive expected profit by bidding a suitably
small, but strictly positive amount, below the actual value; therefore
we conclude that the better informed bidder will bid strictly less than
the actual value with positive probability. Finally, this allows the
less informed bidder to obtain a strictly positive expected profit by
simply always bidding his estimate of the value. Indeed, since his
estimate is a lower bound on the value, bidding this estimate never
results in a loss to the less informed bidder, and since the better
informed bidder bids less than the actual value with positive probabi-
lity, the less informed bidder has a positive probability of winning an
object worth strictly more than his bid. Therefore, the less informed
bidder should expect a strictly positive expected profit so long as he
has any uncertainty in the object's actual value.
Summary:
This paper presents two families of examples in which an imperfectly
informed bidder should reasonably expect a strictly positive expected
profit when bidding against a competitor who is perfectly informed about
the object's value. Providing the less informed bidder with perfect
information would result in both bidders having exactly the same infor-
mation, and then both bidders should expect zero profit. Therefore,
ignorance of the perfect information a genie might offer to provide—and
your competitor's knowing that you are ignorant of this information—may
indeed be bliss.
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